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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

LETHRON D. TATE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 981793-CA
Priority No. 2

:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Given the state's concession that (1) the revocation was
based solely on hearsay, (2) the judge did not make a finding of
good cause, and (3) nothing in the record supports good cause,
the only issue for this Court is whether the order revoking
probation should be vacated.

Controlling case law from Utah

appellate courts requires that the order revoking probation be
vacated.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AT
THE PROBATION REVOCATION HEARING REQUIRES THAT THE
ORDER REVOKING PROBATION BE VACATED.
The state concedes that the revocation in this case was
based solely on hearsay, and that the trial judge did not make a
finding that good cause justified the use of hearsay.
brief ("S.B.") at 5-6.

State's

The state further concedes that nothing

in the record supports a finding that good cause existed which
justified the use of the hearsay evidence.

S.B. at 5-6.

Despite these concessions, the state insists that it ought
to be given a second bite of the apple, asking that this Court

remand the matter "to the trial court for findings as to the
existence of good cause for the use of hearsay evidence, or to
allow defendant to cross-examine the witnesses upon which the
State relies."

S.B. at 9.

The state apparently bases its claim

regarding the remedy on the following factors:

(1) if the case

were remanded, the state might be able to establish good cause
because " [a] finding of good cause requires the trial court to
balance the defendant's interest in cross-examining a witness
against the State's need to use a particular hearsay statement"
(S.B. at 6) and a co-conspirator's hearsay statement might be
admissible in a probation revocation hearing if the state offered
"'a reasonably satisfactory explanation' for not bringing [the
co-conspirator] in as a witness" (S.B. at 6-7); (2) the state's
erroneous claim that the evidence supporting the aggravated
assault is not affected by the unreliability of a co-defendant's
statement and "was based essentially on the officers' non-hearsay
testimony regarding the nature of the victim's injuries and a
photo line-up identification of defendant by the victim" (S.B. at
7);

(3) "[a] probation revocation may be based solely upon

hearsay" (S.B. at 8 ) ; and (4) case law from other jurisdictions
which the state claims supports a remand rather than vacation of
the probation order (S.B. at 8-9).
The rationale offered by the state for remanding the case
for a finding of good cause is not compelling when scrutinized.
Moreover, the remedy requested by the state is contrary to
controlling case law.

See e.g. Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d
2

1294, 1300 (Utah App. 1990)(vacating order violating probation
where revocation based on hearsay); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774, 788 (Utah 1991) (failure to make findings which were
prerequisite to admission of evidence requires reversal of
conviction).
In Peronek, this Court held that the defendant's probation
was revoked in violation of due process where the revocation was
based solely on hearsay, the trial judge did not make a finding
of good cause, and "nothing in the record suggests good cause for
denying the defendant this fundamental right [of confrontation]."
Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299.

This Court further held that the

appropriate remedy where the probation violation was based on
unreliable hearsay and the record failed to suggest good cause
for depriving the defendant of his right to confrontation is to
vacate the order revoking probation.

Peronek, 803 P.2d at 13 00.

The Peronek holding that the probation revocation order must be
vacated where the revocation is based on hearsay and the record
fails to suggest good cause for denying the right to
confrontation resolves the issue as to remedy in this case.
Additionally, case law from the Utah Supreme Court and this
Court requires that an order be vacated where the trial judge
failed to make findings which were a prerequisite to admission of
evidence.

See e.g. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788; State v. Nelson,

950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App. 1997).

In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme

Court refused to remand the case for factual findings as to the
admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony.
3

Instead,

the Court stated:
However, in the present case the failure to make
findings is not a mere technical oversight that makes
it difficult for us to adequately review the trial
court's ruling.
[citation omitted] Instead, we have a
failure of the judge to address the factual questions
and to make the legal determinations that were a
prerequisite to the admission of the eyewitness
identification essential to the conviction. To ask the
trial court to address the admissibility question now
would be to tempt it to reach a post hoc
rationalization for the admission of this pivotal
evidence. Such a mode of proceeding holds too much
potential for abuse. The only fair way to proceed is
to vacate defendant's conviction and remand the matter
for retrial.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788; see also Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944
(vacating conviction where trial judge failed to make findings or
conclusions regarding admissibility of eyewitness identification
testimony); see also State v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah
1993)(vacating conviction where defendant never advised of
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation since trial
judge "could not then or now assess [defendant's] responses to
that advice").
Although the state ignores the remedies in Peronek, Ramirez,
Bakalov, and Nelson, these cases nevertheless demonstrate that
the order revoking probation should be vacated.

As was the case

in Ramirez, the trial judge in this case did not make findings
which were a prerequisite to admission of the evidence.

See

Appellant's opening brief at 16-17, citing cases requiring a
finding of good cause as a prerequisite for admission of hearsay.
To ask the trial court to resolve the good cause issue at this
juncture "would be to tempt it to reach a post hoc
4

rationalization for the admission of this pivotal evidence."
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 789.

Such a mode of proceeding was rejected

in Ramirez in the context of admission of eyewitness
identification at trial.

Although the instant case involves the

admission of hearsay evidence in a probation violation hearing,
the rationale nevertheless applies, and requires that this Court
vacate the revocation order.
Moreover, as the state concedes, nothing in the record
supports a good cause determination.

Hence, the remand requested

by the state exceeds the remand rejected in Ramirez since the
state is also seeking the ability to put on further evidence.
Since the state failed to introduce evidence demonstrating that
the good cause prerequisite was met, the probation order must be
vacated.
The state's apparent argument that it might be able to
establish good cause because a good cause determination is based
on a balancing of the defendant's right to cross-examination with
the state's need for the hearsay (S.B. at 6) adds nothing to the
analysis of whether the state ought to be given the opportunity
at this late date to put on evidence regarding good cause.

Nor

does the state's claim that a co-conspirator's statements might
come in at a probation violation hearing affect the issue of
whether the state ought to be given a chance to show good cause
at this juncture.

Regardless of whether good cause for allowing

a co-conspirator's hearsay statement might exist in some
circumstances, in the present case, the state did not demonstrate
5

good cause for the admission of such statements.
In addition, in cases where the admission of a coconspirator's statement has been upheld, the trial judge made a
finding of reliability which was supported by the record.

See

e.g. United States v. Zentaraf, 20 F. 3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 1994)
(cited in S.B. at 7 ) .

In the present case, no such finding was

made and, as set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 19-35, the
statements were not reliable.

Moreover, courts which have

admitted hearsay statements of co-conspirators have recognized
that ordinarily such statements are not reliable.
910.

See id. at

For example, in Zentgraf, the court relied on Bruton v.

United States, 931 U.S. 123 (1968) and Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530 (1986) for the proposition that "[o]rdinarily, the
reliability of an accomplice's confession implicating the accused
is viewed with 'special suspicion.'"

Zentgraf, 20 F. 3d at 910.

The state's suggestion that the probation violation should
be upheld because the finding that Tate committed an aggravated
assault was not based on hearsay (S.B. at 7) is incorrect.
Officer Kent testified regarding Josh Wagstaff's statements to
her about Hanson's injuries as well as Hanson's statements to her
about his injuries.

R. 88:35-36.

which did not fit any exceptions.

This testimony was hearsay
Indeed, the state has not

claimed that the testimony fit any exceptions or otherwise
briefed its rationale for the claim that Officer Kent's testimony
regarding the statements of others which were offered for the

6

truth of the matter asserted was not hearsay.1
Additionally, Officer Kent's testimony that Hanson selected
Tate from a photo spread was hearsay.

While Hanson could have

testified to such a selection, Officer Kent's testimony was the
statement of another, Hanson's selection of Appellant, which was
offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

Again, the state

merely makes a bald assertion that this was not hearsay, and
makes no claim that the evidence fit within a hearsay exception.
Moreover, the state later refers to the "hearsay witness
identifications," thereby undercutting its claim that this
testimony was not hearsay.

See S.B. at 8.

The state made no attempt to establish good cause for the
use of the hearsay testimony that Hanson selected Appellant from
a photo lineup.

In addition, the hearsay was not reliable given

the problems with eyewitness identification, the vagueness of
Hanson's report, and the state's apparent inability to obtain
Hanson as a witness.

See Appellant's opening brief at 34.

Officer Salazar testified regarding the injuries he saw when
he arrived at the restaurant and located an injured man.
R. 88:29.

While this testimony was not hearsay, it also did not

1

The state does not cite to the portions of the record it
relies on for its claim that the aggravated assault "was based
essentially on the officers' non-hearsay testimony regarding the
nature of the victim's injuries and a photo line-up identification
of defendant by the victim."
S.B. at 7.
The state's bald
assertion without reference to the hearsay rules or exceptions
coupled with the lack of record cites fails to meet the briefing
requirements of Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
This Court should decline to review this aspect of the state's
argument.
7

implicate Tate or demonstrate that an assault rather than a fight
occurred.

This non-hearsay testimony established only that

Hanson was injured and was not sufficient to sustain the finding
that Tate committed an aggravated assault.
The state also appears to argue that a remand rather than
vacation of the revocation order is appropriate because " [a]
probation revocation may be based solely upon hearsay."
at 8.

S.B.

While the state is correct that some courts have held that

probation may be revoked based solely on reliable hearsay (see
State v. Miller, 888 P.2d 399 (Kan. App. 1995), cited in S.B. at
8), other courts have held otherwise.

See Miller, 888 P.2d at

406-07, citing cases that have held that probation violation
cannot be based solely on reliable hearsay; see also cases cited
in Appellant's opening brief at 20.

Regardless of whether a

probation violation can be based solely on reliable hearsay, in
this case, the hearsay was not reliable and not properly admitted
as set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 14-35.
Finally, the state relies on decisions from other states
remanding for further proceedings rather than revoking probation.
As previously outlined, Peronek and Ramirez, case law from Utah
appellate courts, control this issue.

Additionally, Zentgraf is

distinguishable because there was other evidence which by itself
would have been legally sufficient for the trial court to revoke
Zentgraf's probation.

Zentgraf, 20 F. 3d at 910.

Because it was

undisputed in Zentgraf that the defendant violated probation by
associating with a convicted felon, there was sufficient evidence
8

for a probation violation without the hearsay.

A question

remained, however, as to whether the trial court would have found
that Zentgraf committed a burglary without the hearsay or how the
trial court would have disposed of the violation if association
were the only violation.
therefore appropriate.

Remand for further proceedings was
The rationale in Zentgraf does not

therefore apply to this case.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's rights to due process and confrontation were
violated when the trial court revoked his probation based on
hearsay and multiple hearsay where the trial court did not make a
preliminary finding that good cause existed for the use of
hearsay, the record does not demonstrate good cause, and the
hearsay evidence was not reliable.

The proper remedy for such

violation is vacation of the order revoking probation^
SUBMITTED this 22**-

day of August, 1999.
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JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

STEPHANIE AMES
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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